

Report # 13.4

Record of recommendations of the
Doolittle and Clark Reports prepared
by LB Kutzpach 2 April 1956

Rec. Regalis file

9 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Executive Registry

FROM : [redacted]
Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Sanitized Copies of
Intelligence Community Studies

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1. Per your telecon of 8 June with [redacted] of this Staff, we are transmitting for your retention the sanitized copies received from the National Security Council of four intelligence community studies, reviewed under the auspice of the NSC in response to the FOIA request of [redacted]. IPS is, of course, retaining record copies of the CIA studies reviewed in response to Mr. [redacted] request.

2. The four studies are as follows:

a. W.H. Jackson, President's Committee on International Information Activities, Report to the President, 30 June 1953.

b. J.H. Doolittle, Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, 30 Sept. 1954.

c. Mark Clark, Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. Task Force Report on Intelligence Activities, May 1955.

d. M.D. Sprague, President's Committee on Informational Activities Abroad, Conclusions and Recommendations, Dec. 1960.

3. It is believed that it will be more useful to lodge these documents with your record and reference set of such reports than with our case files in the Records Center.

[redacted]


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Enclosures: As noted

*Doolittle Report
ER Report # 15.B*

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
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FORM OF REPORT

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

For the purpose of safeguarding sensitive information, certain agencies have adopted a system of clearance procedures designed to limit the access thereto on a need-to-know basis. These procedures require individuals to obtain a special clearance over and above those required for access to material classified confidential, secret, and top secret. Material in this report concerning covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and that relating to the National Security Agency come within the requirements for special clearance. Normally, the Atomic Energy Commission requires a special clearance; however, the material presented herein is of such nature that those possessing a "top secret" clearance may be granted access to it without undergoing the special investigation prescribed by the AEC. For security reasons, therefore, the form of this report is at variance in some respects with that prescribed by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. Findings of the task force with respect to those matters not requiring special clearance other than top secret are contained in the main body of the report. Conclusions and recommendations appear at the end of each

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item discussed. These conclusions and recommendations are summarized in one section immediately following the presentation of the task-force findings. Findings, conclusions, and recommendations with respect to the National Security Agency and covert activities of the CIA are included in Appendices I and II respectively.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The task force wishes to acknowledge the complete cooperation given it by all the officials and members of their staffs throughout the departments and agencies surveyed, and believes it was freely given the "raw" intelligence required. The enthusiasm and interest which the personnel engaged in intelligence activities displayed in the work was gratifying to the members of the task force and its staff. Their full cooperation enabled us to complete our assignments within the allotted time.

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The chairman and the staff director are most appreciative of the support rendered by the executive staff of the President and other Government officials who appeared and were interviewed and gave us their time and the benefit of their knowledge; and of the help of the executive staff of the Commission, particularly John B. Hollister, W. Hallam Tuck, Francis P. Brasseur, and Clara Demuling. Without Miss Demuling's able assistance, the job of obtaining security clearances for the task force and staff would not have been accomplished in time to permit completion of our survey.

The chairman also is deeply obligated to and most appreciative of the valued support and contributions of his colleagues on the task force, the members of the staff, and the able consultants.

The task force further wishes to express its deep gratitude for the valuable aid of those public-spirited individuals who gave freely of their time, and who by their objective approach to the problem and their government experience materially enlightened our members. We are especially grateful for the advice and the benefit of the wide experience of Major General William J. Donovan, former Chief of the Office of Strategic Services; J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; William H. Jackson, former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; General W. Redell Smith, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Major General Charles A. Willoughby, former Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command; and others.

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The attached was prepared by Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick for/^{his} presentation to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, 2 April 1956.

(Relates to both Clark and Doolittle Reports)

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MONDAY, 2 APRIL 1956

A total of 85 recommendations directly affecting CIA were made by the Doolittle and Clark groups--38 by the Doolittle group and 47 by the Clark group. It should be remembered that the Doolittle group covered only the Clandestine Services and the related support services and activities. Grouping the recommendations into generally related subjects, there were a total of 68 recommendations. In some of these categories, both groups made identical recommendations. There were ten recommendations made by both groups which were almost identical, and in some of these groups both survey teams made several on the same subject; for example, NSCID-5 or "agreed activities" there were four, three Clark and one Doolittle; cover, there were six, three by each; defectors, there were five, four by Clark and one by Doolittle.

Grouping the recommendations by categories: in I, Organization and Administration of CIA, there were 14 recommendations--nine by the Clark group, four by Doolittle and one made by both; II, Personnel, one by Clark, five by Doolittle and one by both; III, Authority, Policy, Coordination and Operations, three by Clark, four by Doolittle and six by both; IV, Security, 13 by Doolittle and two by both; V, Fiscal and Budget, two by each; VI, Intelligence Community, 15 by the Clark group.

Specifically as to action taken: nine of the ten recommendations (or groups of recommendations) made by both groups are being implemented or have been; 24 of the 28 Doolittle recommendations have been or are being implemented, and 18 of the 30 exclusively Clark recommendations have been or are in the process of implementation. It should be recognized in connection with the Clark recommendations that we received only within the last month 13 of their 47 recommendations affecting CIA. These 13 were contained in the Defense Department section

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which CIA was asked to comment on March 2, 1956. It should also be noted that on some of these actions we are awaiting the White House view.

Group I covers Organization and Administration of CIA on which there were nine recommendations by the Clark group, four by the Doolittle group, and one by both.

| | | |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 both | a new building | implementing |
| 2 Doolittle | location of DD/P | implementing |
| 3 | simplification of DD/P organization | |
| 4 | IG Agency-wide | implementing |
| 5 | fewer buildings | implementing |
| 6 Clark | separate FI and PP | non-concur |
| 7 | directive of 15 July 1952 | implemented |
| 8 | Office of Basic Intelligence | implementing part |
| 9 | Executive Director | |
| 10 | Executive Pay Bill | implemented |
| 11 | Deputies as appointees | non-concur |
| 12 | internal management survey | implementing |
| 13 | DD/P on OCB | non-concur |
| 14 | Watch-Dog Committee | implemented part |

Group II covers Personnel on which there were one recommendation by the Clark group, five by Doolittle and one by both.

| | | |
|-------------|---|--------------|
| 1 both | intensified training especially languages | implementing |
| 2 Doolittle | improved recruitment | implementing |
| 3 | eliminate mediocres | implementing |
| 4 Doolittle | increased competency | implementing |
| 5 | qualified field assignments | implementing |

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| | | |
|---------|-------------------------|--------------|
| 6 | Director above politics | implementing |
| 7 Clark | more retired officers | implementing |

Group III covers Authority, Policy, Coordination and Operations on which there were three recommendations by the Clark group, four by Doolittle and six by both.

| | | |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|--------------|
| 1 both | agreed activities 3.c.1.d. | |
| 2 | intensify espionage - CE | implementing |
| 3 | develop cover 3.c.3.d. | implementing |
| 4 | defectors 4.c.1.d. | implementing |
| 5 | NSC 5412 - coordination | implementing |
| 6 | assets for guerrilla warfare | implementing |
| 7 Doolittle | standards for cover | implementing |
| 8 Doolittle | covert coordination with State | implementing |
| 9 | exchange of programs with military | implementing |
| 10 | long-range plans | implementing |
| 11 Clark | PW budget to NSC | non-concur |
| 12 | senior commander informed | implementing |
| 13 | overflights receive constant review | implementing |

Group IV covers security on which there were 13 recommendations by Doolittle and two by both.

| | | |
|-------------|----------------------------------|--------------|
| 1 both | security rechecks - five years | implementing |
| 2 | penalties and suspension | implementing |
| 3 Doolittle | eliminate provisional clearances | implementing |
| 4 | improve initial indoctrination | implementing |
| 5 | coordinate security - CE | implementing |
| 6 | polygraph rest of employees | implemented |

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|----|-----------|------------------------------------|--------------|
| 7 | Doolittle | uniform security procedures | implemented |
| 8 | | processing of aliens overseas | implementing |
| 9 | | security of proprietaries | implementing |
| 10 | | Security Officers to proprietaries | implemented |
| 11 | | emergency plans | implemented |
| 12 | | overseas security reports | non-concur |
| 13 | | overseas security inspection | implemented |
| 14 | | need-to-know dissemination | implemented |
| 15 | | over-classification | implementing |

Group V on Fiscal and Budget has four recommendations, two each by the Clark and Doolittle groups.

| | | | |
|---|-----------|--------------------------------|-------------|
| 1 | Doolittle | more info to Comptroller | implemented |
| 2 | | review by PRC | implemented |
| 3 | Clark | budgets by area divisions stop | non-concur |
| 4 | | increase auditors | implemented |

Group VI on the Intelligence Community has 15 recommendations, all by the Clark Task Force.

| | | | |
|---|-------|--------------------------------|--------------|
| 1 | Clark | Soviet Union Primary; Increase | implementing |
| 2 | | IAC new collection techniques | implementing |
| 3 | | technological collection | implementing |
| 4 | | mechanical analysis file | implementing |
| 5 | | revise all NSC and DCID's | |
| 6 | | glossary of terms | implementing |
| 7 | | single library index system | |
| 8 | | intelligence research center | |

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|----|-------|--------------------------------------|--------------|
| 9 | Clark | scientific intelligence committee | |
| 10 | | concentrate on atomic energy | |
| 11 | | define AEC responsibility | |
| 12 | | AEC Intelligence Division | |
| 13 | | members of JAEIC | implementing |
| 14 | | AE portion of NIE's | implementing |
| 15 | | scientific and publications attaches | implementing |

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Action Taken on Doolittle and Clark Recommendations

- I. Organization and Administration of CIA
- II. Personnel
- III. Authority, Policy, Coordination and Operations
- IV. Security
- V. Fiscal and Budget
- VI. The Intelligence Community

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TAB

HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the Covert Intelligence and "cold war" functions of the Deputy Director (Plans) be assigned to separate Deputy Directors whose areas of responsibility shall be administratively and logistically self-supporting. (Recommendation No. 1 of Public Report; pages 33, 34, 50, 68 and 72 of the Top Secret Report; pages 13, 39, 56 and 58 of Appendix II.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

This recommendation is, in actuality, two separate recommendations which are not necessarily interdependent:

1. The separation of intelligence from cold war functions.
2. The self-containment of administrative and logistical support.

With respect to the first of these two items, it should be noted that such separate organizations were existent in CIA until 1952. At that time, under a reorganization plan formulated by General Walter Bedell Smith, the two organizations were merged under a single Deputy Director but maintained separate Staff elements to cover each of the separate functional responsibilities. The experience of CIA during the period of separate operation prior to 1952 proved the operational disadvantages of attempting to conduct, on a secure and efficient basis, two world-wide clandestine organizations, each compartmented from the other.

We do not feel the separation of support responsibility from the Clandestine Services impairs the principle of security compartmentation, since the number of people who "need to know" the information will be essentially the same however organized. Organization of separate supporting elements for each of the Clandestine Services would be both a costly duplication and one which would not bring about as effective support.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Not any.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Location, organization and administration of covert organization so as to maintain maximum security with reference to personnel and activities. (Page 17)

CIA COMMENT

We have been tightening administration practices to better protect the Clandestine Services. A new regulation on cover will provide guidance to all personnel.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Implementation in progress.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the part of Agency Directive of 15 July 1952 appointing area division chiefs as executives of the Director of Central Intelligence and providing for direct dealing with him and Senior Representatives be rescinded. (Pages 11, 56, and 58 of Appendix II.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

No comment.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

This directive has been revised and reissued.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

With respect to Agency as a whole: That remainder of Agency be reorganized with Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, an Executive Director, a general secretariat, necessary staff sections and offices of administrative and logistic services and an operating Deputy Director (Intelligence) with seven offices thereunder as follows: Office of Basic Intelligence (now Basic Intelligence Division, Office of Research and Reports); Office of Reference & Liaison (now Office of Collection and Dissemination); Office of Collection (now Office of Operations); Office of Scientific Research (now Office of Scientific Intelligence); Office of Economic and Geographic Research (now Office of Research and Reports); Office of Current Intelligence (OCI); and Office of National Estimates (ONE). (Pages 35, 36, 42, 46, 49, 50, 69, 70 and 73 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

We concur with the creation of an Office of Basic Intelligence. This has been accomplished by the elevation of the appropriate division of the Office of Research and Reports to Office status.

The balance of this recommendation consists of suggesting that four of the six names of offices under the Deputy Director (Intelligence) be changed. We believe that a better name for the Office of Collection and Dissemination would be the Office of Central Reference, and will make that change shortly. We do not concur that the Office of Reference & Liaison is appropriate because this Office conducts little liaison. We see little to be accomplished in the other name changes. We would point out that changing the name of a major component in a government agency is costly and results in considerable confusion and waste over a period of some time. Inasmuch as these offices have been so named for several years, we do not believe the name changes worth-while.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Office of Basic Intelligence established. Office of Collection and Dissemination renamed Office of Central Reference.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That CIA re-establish the Office of Executive Director.
(Pages 31, 32, 69 and 73 of Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

Under the present organization the Director and the Deputy Director have, in effect, three Executive Directors in the Deputy Directors for Plans, Intelligence and Support. To interpose another command echelon would not necessarily relieve the Director of any work load and might merely interpose a further echelon between the operating staffs and final action. Any failure now to delegate is not due to the lack of an organizational mechanism, but rather is due to the inherently delicate nature of CIA's problems which demand active participation by the Director.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Under consideration.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the Executive Pay Bill of 1949 be amended to increase the annual salary of the Director of Central Intelligence to the equivalent of the pay of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (now \$20,000); to bring the compensation of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence up to \$17,500, the same as that of most Under Secretaries of the Executive Branch; and to provide operating directors of areas of responsibility in Intelligence with proportionate salaries. (Recommendation No. 3 of Public Report; pages 66 and 75 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

Salary adjustments to increase the annual salary of the Director of Central Intelligence to the equivalent of the pay of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and that of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to that of most Under Secretaries have been discussed with the Bureau of the Budget, and are included in the Executive Pay Bill now being considered by the Congress.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

As indicated above.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That status of three major operating Deputy Directors be changed from CS (GS-18) to Public Law Presidential appointee at \$16,000 per annum. (Pages 34, 35, 66, 69, and 72 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

We concur in the recommendation that the pay scales of the senior officials of the Agency be increased. The recommendation that the status of the operating deputies be changed to Public Law Presidential appointees is questioned. Certain of the deputies carry on operations of a highly classified nature. It would be unwise in each case to seek Senate approval, particularly where an individual's background and competence in clandestine operations would have to be reviewed. We have received no indication of any Senatorial desire to review CIA appointments other than the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

None.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Simplification of elaborate staff structure of the DD/P.
(Page 17.)

CIA COMMENT

No comment.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Several studies of Clandestine Services Organization have been made. DD/P plans to make certain changes progressively.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That a comprehensive internal management survey of the Agency be conducted by CIA following recommended re-organization. (Pages 50 and 73 of Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

We presently have three concurrent programs in effect. The Inspector General, during the past two years, has been conducting a component by component survey of CIA, paying particular attention to management problems. The Deputy Director (Plans) has a staff complement specializing in inspection and review of clandestine operations. Lastly, a Management Staff under the Deputy Director (Support) has recently been revitalized and is now concerning itself with the corrective phases of management and administrative systems. Further, we are considering the pros and cons of bringing in a cleared group of management engineers to advise us on organization. Here is should be noted that an intelligence agency, for security and other reasons, cannot be organized on the lines of a commercial undertaking, and few management engineers have the background for giving competent advice in the intelligence field.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

By early 1957 every component in CIA will have been thoroughly surveyed by both the Management Staff and the Inspector General. Management changes calculated to increase the efficiency of the organization are being constantly made as a result of these surveys.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That "cold war" operating deputy director be designated as the CIA representative on OCB to free the Director of Central Intelligence for Agency intelligence functions. (Pages 34, 70, and 73 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

The Director serves as the Central Intelligence Agency representative on the OCB by virtue of specific Presidential directive. Instructions issued under this directive enjoin the DCI to participate personally at OCB meetings to the greatest extent possible. In view of the function of the OCB, the level of representation from other departments and agencies, and the range of CIA interests in OCB matters, this is a proper requirement. This participation is not unduly burdensome on the Director, since he has a special assistant who devotes his full time to this activity..

In addition, the Deputy Director (Plans) is closely associated with such OCB activity in that CIA members of OCB working groups are drawn from Clandestine Services personnel. The Deputy Director (Plans) relieves the Director of one substantial demand on his time, in this connection, by serving as the Agency representative on the Plans Coordination Group of the OCB.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Necessary action taken.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Assigning to Inspector General authority and responsibility for Agency-wide investigations. (Page 17)

CIA COMMENT

None.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

This recommendation is now in effect.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That Congress be requested to appropriate funds to construct adequate CIA housing facilities in or near Washington. (Recommendation No. 7 of Public Report; pages 52, 53, 54, 71 and 74 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Centralized accommodations, hand-tailored to its needs, should be provided to house the Agency.

CIA COMMENT

This has been done. The 1st session of the 84th Congress appropriated sufficient funds for planning a building, and passed the necessary authorization.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Architectural plans are now being prepared. The Congress will be asked to appropriate money during the 2nd session of the 84th Congress. A full-time building staff within the Agency will insure that the building is the best possible for CIA needs.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

Covered in recommendation referring to acquisition of a CIA building.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Concentration of CIA's headquarters operations in fewer buildings with increased emphasis in the interim on improvement of the physical security of CIA's many buildings and the classified data and materials contained therein. (Page 15.)

CIA COMMENT

Concur. Constant efforts are being made to improve the physical security in our present buildings.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER RECOMMENDATION

- a. That the President appoint a committee of experienced private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine and report to him periodically on the work of the Government foreign intelligence activities. This committee should also give such information to the public as the President may direct. The committee should function on a part time and per diem basis.
- b. That the Congress consider creating a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In such case, the two committees, one Presidential and the other Congressional, could collaborate on matters of special importance to the National security. (Sole specific recommendation of the Hoover Commission, pages 1-2 of the Public Report.)

CLARK RECOMMENDATION

That a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, composed of members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost national respect and confidence, be established by act of Congress to make periodic surveys of the organization, functions, policies, and results of the Government agencies handling foreign intelligence operations; and to report, under adequate security safeguards, its findings and recommendations to the Congress, and to the President, annually and at such other times as may be necessary or advisable. The proposed "watch-dog" commission should be empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needs for its own use. It should be patterned after the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission). Appointments by the President of persons from private life to the proposed Commission should be made from a select list of distinguished individuals of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and ability, with records of unselfish service to the Nation. (Recommendation No. 2 of Public Report, pages 312-317 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

We concur in recommendation (a) of the Hoover Commission, and, at the appropriate time, will make certain suggestions to the President with regard to the composition of such a civilian committee.

(cont'd)

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We further concur in the conclusions of the Hoover Commission insofar as it might pertain to this Agency that "while mixed Congressional and Citizens Committees for temporary service are useful and helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make recommendations, such Committees, if permanent, present difficulties."

With respect to recommendation (b) of the Hoover Commission concerning a Congressional Watch Dog Committee, we would point out that the CIA at the present time reports to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House on legislative and other related matters of interest to the Congress, and to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees in regard to our annual budget and other matters affecting appropriations. All of these respective committees have taken an active interest in the affairs of the Agency and, insofar as our work is concerned, we do not consider that a Joint Committee would add any essential helpful element. If the President and the Congress consider that a Joint Congressional Watch Dog Committee is desirable, we would be able to live with it provided such a Committee and its staff afforded the same high degree of security which we have found in the past in our dealings with the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

ACTION TAKEN

The President has established a Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

The Congress presently has under consideration several bills to establish a joint committee on intelligence activities.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Review and improvement of recruitment plans and procedures in order to obtain higher quality applicants for Agency jobs. The time required to process them should be reduced. (Page 11.)

CIA COMMENT

We concur. Increasing emphasis is being given to recruitment techniques.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

A personnel consultant program has been established.

Operational personnel are being used to recruit specialists.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

That the Agency personnel competence level be raised. The Agency should continually strive to achieve this and if necessary reduce its present work load to expedite its realization. Necessary steps are:

Elimination of personnel who can never achieve a sufficiently high degree of competence to meet the CIA standard. This will entail a substantial reduction in present personnel. There is no place in CIA for mediocrity. (Page 11.)

CIA COMMENT

Every step will be taken to eliminate mediocre personnel. A program for improving supervisory personnel is in effect.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

A special Employment Review Board is reviewing the cases of mediocre personnel, and separating those below standard.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Increasing CIA capacity to meet National commitments despite personnel and fiscal reductions. (Page 18)

CIA COMMENT

An increased capacity to meet National commitments will be accomplished as greater professional competence is attained by Agency personnel. Actually, although there was a leveling off in personnel in 1954, there was a gradual increase in 1955. Demands levied against the Agency still are greater than can be met with our present assets.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

As indicated above.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the program for training of specialists in covert intelligence collection and for the development of linguists be intensified. (Recommendation No. 9 of the Public Report; pages 45, 57 and 59 of Appendix II.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Continual improvement of the present excellent training facilities and capabilities in all covert activities to keep step with future requirements.

An intensified training program to include those key personnel in the covert services who require additional training, by rotation through C.I.A. training facilities. At present at least 10 per cent of total covert personnel should be in training. (Page 11.)

CIA COMMENT

We concur in the necessity for the training of specialists in covert intelligence and the development of linguists. Five new covert training courses have been created during the last year. A mandatory quota of five per cent of all Clandestine Service personnel are in training at all times.

Our capabilities in language training have steadily expanded. In addition to a great variety of part-time programs, we have available approximately one hundred full-time intensive courses in nearly forty languages, and thirty to forty integrated area-language programs. Approximately eight per cent of the personnel in the intelligence producing offices are receiving pertinent training at all times. A program of incentive awards is being considered to stimulate interest in acquiring and maintaining proficiency, particularly in languages of those countries of major intelligence interest.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendations being implemented.

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HOOPER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Assignment to field stations and to country areas of only those people who are fully qualified to handle the highly specialized problems involved. (Page 12.)

CIA COMMENT

This is difficult to accomplish with a training quota, and the demands of priority projects. However, every effort is made to assign only well-trained personnel overseas.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Maintaining the position of Director above political considerations in order to assure tenure and continuity as in the F.B.I.
(Page 12)

COMMENT BY CIA

The Director has maintained a completely non-political approach to Agency problems. Every attempt is made to keep relations with the Congress on a bipartisan basis.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That CIA Act of 1949 be amended to authorize employment of "any" (15 now authorized) retired officers or warrant officers of the armed services; and to authorize CIA personnel dependent medical benefits and leave accumulations equivalent to Foreign Service members. (Recommendations 3 and 4 of the Public Report; pages 61, 65, 66 and 74 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

The Agency would welcome a liberalization of Section 6(f) (2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (Public Law 110, 81st Congress, as amended) which authorizes it, notwithstanding any other legislation, to employ and pay 15 retired commissioned or warrant officers of the armed services. An increase of the total authorized to a new total of between 25 and 50 would allow greater flexibility in our personnel program. It should be pointed out, however, that the present restriction is mitigated, inasmuch as it pertains only to officers retired for longevity. The Agency has some former officers of the regular services retired for physical or combat disability, some serving as senior officials.

CIA has made considerable strides in the past three years in establishing a career service program. Extensive use of retired commissioned officers who, in view of age and experience, would only be willing to consider relatively senior assignments must be tempered by a consideration of the possible adverse effects on the morale of regular career employees.

We concur in granting Foreign Service benefits for dependents, medical assistance and leave accumulations to CIA personnel. It is believed that proposed legislation on the awarding of career service benefits to Federal employees stationed abroad will authorize the granting of these privileges.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Awaiting approval by the White House and Bureau of the Budget.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the NSC interpret provisions of paragraph 4b, NSC-5412/1 as it affects the several members of the intelligence community. (Pages 55, 57 and 59 of Appendix II.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

That one agency be charged with the coordination of all covert operations in peacetime, subject to the provision that necessary flexibility be achievable in time of war. The covert operating capabilities of CIA must be continually improved. Steps toward these ends are:

1. Implementation of NSC-5412 which now makes CIA the coordinating agency pending a national emergency. (Page 15)

CIA COMMENT

Paragraph 4b of NSC-5412/1 reads, "Informing through appropriate channels on a need-to-know basis, agencies of the U. S. Government, both at home and abroad, including diplomatic and military representatives, of such operations as will affect them."

The CIA has been scrupulously careful to keep other Government agencies appropriately informed of its activities insofar as they may be concerned therewith. This obligation has involved a difficult balance between the proper range of interest of another agency and the restrictive principle of "need-to-know." We are aware, from time to time, that individual judgments in individual cases may have failed to find the proper balance of these considerations. We are trying constantly to remedy and prevent these instances, but we do not see how further generalized interpretation of this provision by the NSC could give substantial help in this problem. It is essentially a case by case issue. It should be noted that as standard procedure we provide individual briefings for ambassadors and other Department of State personnel; the Department of Defense commanders, chiefs of military missions, attaches and other important staff officers.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the proposed annual Psychological Warfare budget and allocations be submitted for NSC approval and subsequent changes presented by Director of Central Intelligence to the Planning Coordination Group of the OCB. (Page 58 of Appendix II.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

This recommendation is not consistent with the character and functioning of the NSC as it has been established. The NSC is an organ for the formulation of basic general policy and it does not have the time and staff which would be required if it were to consider details of budget and funds allocation. In development of its Psychological Warfare budgets, this Agency is careful to conform to policy established by the NSC, and to request NSC authorization for any proposed action which is not covered by existing policy. In addition, it is the current practice of the Director of Central Intelligence to keep the NSC closely informed concerning Psychological Warfare programs.

In the current U. S. Governmental organization, the OCB is the presently designated element for consideration of the more specific features of Psychological Warfare programs and budgets.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

None.

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HOOPER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Improvement at all levels of coordination of CIA covert activities with the State Department. (Page 16)

CIA COMMENT

We concur.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation implemented. Coordination effected at following levels:

- by DCI with Under Secretary and through OCB
- by DD/P with Deputy Under Secretary and Assistant Secretaries
- by Chief PP with State coordination officer

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

A greater interchange of information, at all working levels, between CIA and the military services regarding their intelligence programs and policies. (Page 16.)

CIA COMMENT

Every effort is being made to insure the fullest possible exchange of information. It is our impression that definite progress has been made.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That senior military commanders in the field be given greater flexibility in their use of information on a "need-to-know" or "eyes only" basis, with due regard to protection of the source. (Pages 307-309 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

We are not aware of any complaints on restrictions on use of information supplied. It is true that on occasion material produced from highly sensitive sources or delicate operations must be handled with utmost care, but the CIA is fully cognizant of the obligation and responsibility to get information to that senior officer responsible for action and policy.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the use of "overflights" to secure vital information receive constant consideration.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

We concur.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Establishment of definite world-wide objectives for the future, and formulation of a comprehensive long-range plan for their achievement. (Page 16)

CIA COMMENT

Concur.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the National Security Council review present assets and direct the necessary action to assure adequate preparation for evasion and escape and support of guerrilla warfare. (Page 204 of the Top Secret Report)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Preparation and test of a readily implementable plan for the immediate and effective availability of local covert assets to theater commanders at the outbreak of war in their areas. (Page 16)

CIA COMMENT

CIA has furnished the JCS and Theater Commanders with accurate information concerning CIA's capability and potential to meet military requirements. This has been done very completely where such requirements have become firm by JCS action. The war planning process as between CIA and the Department of Defense has not reached such a state that either CIA or Defense can yet judge the adequacy of CIA's ability to fulfill military requirements. NSC review would be premature before firm military requirements have been established by the JCS, and before CIA has had a reasonable time after the receipt of the requirements to show what it can or cannot do.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

As indicated above.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

That greater security be developed at all levels of the Agency to the end that the good name of the United States and the fulfilment of CIA's important mission may not be jeopardized. The following steps should be taken to accomplish these objectives:

Elimination, to the maximum extent practicable, of provisional and preliminary clearances in the security processing of prospective Agency personnel. (Page 12.)

CIA COMMENT

We concur.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

Professional personnel granted provisional or preliminary clearances only in exceptional cases and then only with specific authority of the DCI.

Clerical personnel are brought into an uncleared pool doing unclassified work, only if necessary to give them a livelihood while awaiting clearance.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That intelligence employees be removed from employment pending final determination of cases when sufficient doubt raised during the conduct of an investigation. Findings and disposition of those cases reported as still in process at conclusion of survey should be reported to the President. (Pages 280, 281, and 283 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Imposition of severe penalties upon employees at any and all levels who advertently or inadvertently violate security. (Page 13.)

CIA COMMENT

This Agency has adhered carefully to the provisions of Executive Order No. 10450 which provides for the suspension, with or without pay, of Federal employees when a reasonable doubt exists as to their security status.

Agency handling of employees under investigation because of substantive allegations concerning their loyalty or security qualifications for employment in sensitive positions is dictated by the provisions of Executive Order 10450. Such employees are placed on a leave status, with pay if the allegations are eventually refuted, without pay if the allegations are sustained and the employee is terminated. Normal reporting procedures, as established in Executive Order 10450, are followed in these cases, and information is furnished to the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, as appropriate. Therefore, the status of such cases is available to the President through the executive agencies he has designated.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Creation of greater security consciousness on the part of all personnel by improving initial indoctrination courses and by conducting regular "security awareness" programs.
(Page 13.)

CIA COMMENT

We concur. The revision of the initial security lecture has been made. Periodic reminders of security are issued from all levels, including the DCI.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Insurance of the closest possible coordination of the counterespionage activities of the covert services with the over-all counterintelligence activities of the Office of Security to prevent, or detect and eliminate, any penetrations of CIA. (Page 13.)

CIA COMMENT

We concur. The closest possible working relationship has been established between the Counter-Intelligence Staff and the Office of Security.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Establishing of uniform and tighter security procedures at headquarters and suitable safeguards in the field the better to insure the security of the Agency's facilities, operations, sources and methods. (Page 13.)

CIA COMMENT

We concur. Establishment of uniform security procedures completed. Continuing emphasis placed on tighter security procedures.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Formulation for immediate implementation of emergency plans and preparations, geared to the specific needs of each station, to insure, as far as possible, adequate safeguarding of personnel and safeguarding or destruction of material, in the event of emergency. (Page 15.)

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CIA COMMENT

Concur. Preparation of such plans is an established requirement.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Periodic security inspections by the Security Office of [] and of DD/P's divisions, staffs and facilities in the United States. (Page 14)

CIA COMMENT

Concur.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation implemented. Both the Director of Security and his Deputy have been on extensive overseas inspection trips since the issuance of the recommendation.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Rigid adherence to the "need-to-know" requirement as the basis for dissemination of classified intelligence developed by the covert services and for intra-Agency dissemination of classified data. (Page 14)

CIA COMMENT

Concur.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Continuous indoctrination and guidance to correct the natural tendency to overclassify documents originating in the Agency. (Page 14)

CIA COMMENT

Concur. The Records Management officers, Top Secret Control officers, Security Office and senior officials of the Agency are all on the alert for this. It is a matter of continuous education.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That submission of budgets to the CIA Project Review Committee by the area division chiefs be discontinued and budget for each covert component be prepared under supervision of its chief and submitted for the component to the Project Review Committee. (Pages 47, 57, and 59 of Appendix II.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

This recommendation is based on a separation of Agency "cold war" and "covert intelligence" functions with which this Agency does not concur. However, in relation to the existing organization, the Clandestine Services planning and programing system, now being put into operation, is designed to assure that the preliminary program and budget recommendations of the Area Divisions will be fully reviewed by the Deputy Director (Plans) and his staff and submitted by the DD/P as an integrated Clandestine Services program.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

None.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

Furnishing the Comptroller (under proper security provisions) with sufficient information on all covert projects to enable him to exercise proper accounting control on a fiscal year basis. (Page 18.)

CIA COMMENT

Concur.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation implemented.

Information supplied Comptroller now sufficient to exercise proper accounting.

FI projects now on fiscal year basis.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

That although the activities of CIA should be expanded, costs of present operations should be reduced. This can be, in part, accomplished through:

1. The exercise of better control over expenditures for all covert projects, and specifically that (except for those of an extremely sensitive nature) they be made subject to review and approval by the Agency's Project Review Committee. (Page 18.)

CIA COMMENT

Concur. All projects except those specifically exempted by the Director must be approved by the Project Review Committee.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the number of auditors of the regular CIA Audit Staff be increased materially. (Pages 52, 57, and 59 of Appendix II.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

We concur. This also was recommended and approved as a result of an internal organizational survey several months ago and is being implemented as rapidly as practicable.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That intelligence community recognize the Soviet Union as a primary target and take concerted action to break this vital intelligence block. (Pages 33-35, 49, 68, 247, 248 and 254 of the Top Secret Report.)

That positive measures be taken to increase quantity and improve quality of intelligence, with emphasis on the target area, to include revision of existing directives assigning collection/production responsibilities. (Pages 236-238, 240 and 244 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

CIA and the entire intelligence community has invariably accorded the Soviet Union the highest priority as a target of intelligence. This is reflected in the Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives issued 28 September 1950, revised 12 June 1952, 4 August 1953, and 14 December 1954. Appropriately, Communist China has been accorded comparable status with respect to its capability to initiate hostile actions against the Free World. The means of obtaining and the production of intelligence on the Soviet/Sino Bloc is a problem always under continuous scrutiny, and is now limited mainly by the factor of human ingenuity.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the Intelligence Advisory Committee act to develop new intelligence collection/production techniques and insure exchange of resulting information. (Pages 236-238, 240 and 244 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

Compliance with this recommendation will be accomplished in conjunction with the Intelligence Advisory Committee action in developing additional intelligence on the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That all possible resources be used to exploit technological means for intelligence collection. (Page 179.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

We concur and are constantly exploring all possible means for technological collection.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That mechanical and electronic devices to analyze, classify, file, and produce intelligence information be put into use at the earliest possible moment. (Page 179)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

We concur. Our Office of Central Reference uses mechanical and electronic devices for these purposes to the greatest possible degree, and we are experimenting with new devices. Together with the Air Force we are utilizing a new "minicard" system which in effect revolutionizes the filing system.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That all National Security Council, Intelligence Advisory Committee and Director of Central Intelligence directives be reviewed by the Intelligence Advisory Committee to establish clearer areas of responsibility and to facilitate allocation of tasks commensurate with capabilities and responsibilities. (Pages 24, 25, 68 and 74 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

The approval of National Security Council, Intelligence Advisory Committee and Director of Central Intelligence directives is preceded by extensive staff work in which all Intelligence Advisory Committee member agencies concerned actively participate.

It is possible that the negotiated character of these directives, and the fact that DCI is a coordinator only, and not a commander, of National intelligence, may reduce the forcefulness and clarity of the product. We do not believe, however, that there is any severely hampering deficiency in this respect.

The Director of Central Intelligence will recommend the establishment of a subcommittee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to review the language and substance of all National Security Council, Intelligence Advisory Committee and Director of Central Intelligence directives and present recommendations, as necessary, to clarify areas of responsibility or reallocate tasks based on the capabilities and responsibilities of member agencies. Particular attention will be paid to those directives issued prior to 1950.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

As indicated above.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That an agreed glossary of intelligence terms be produced and reviewed periodically. (Pages 227, 228, and 244 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

CIA has compiled a glossary of intelligence terms. Action will be taken through the Intelligence Advisory Committee to secure acceptance of such a glossary as the authoritative dictionary of intelligence nomenclature.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the Intelligence Advisory Committee consider the adoption of a single library index system based on CIA's Intelligence Subject Code now in use. (Pages 303, 304, and 305 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

We concur. The adoption by the entire intelligence community of an index system based on CIA's Intelligence Subject Code has been promoted vigorously over the past few years. It has been adopted by the Air Force and G-2, and a special subcommittee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is currently studying the means to establish this system on a community-wide basis.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

As indicated above.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That an intelligence research center be established under the CIA to guide the total intelligence research program. (Page 179.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

This matter is now under study. There is considerable merit in a centralized, cooperative research center provided that all agencies will participate and utilize the product.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

As indicated above.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That Scientific Estimates Committee be abolished and there be established under the Intelligence Advisory Committee a Scientific Intelligence Committee with appropriate sub-committees to insure community-wide coordination. (Pages 42, 70, and 74 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

We are in general agreement with this recommendation and have strengthened the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and the Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee. These matters are under active consideration in the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

As indicated above.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That CIA devote special attention to the production of atomic energy intelligence. (Pages 208, 216, and 220 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

CIA and the intelligence community have long ago agreed that the highest priority be accorded the following objectives (underscoring supplied):

"Soviet development, production, disposition, and employment of weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for nuclear attack on the United States and/or key U.S. overseas installations or for defense of the Soviet Bloc against air attack. Particular reference is made to the development, production, and employment of: (1) nuclear weapons; (2) delivery systems, including aircraft, guided missiles, and related base facilities; and (3) the components of the Soviet air defense systems.

"Soviet capabilities, plans and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons."

Continuous attention at the highest level is directed to seeing that this program is energetically implemented.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

As indicated above.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the Atomic Energy Commission's intelligence responsibility be defined by NSC directive. (Pages 42, 219, and 220 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

The intelligence responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission are now under discussion between the CIA and Atomic Energy Commission. At the appropriate time an NSC directive will be proposed.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

As indicated above.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the Atomic Energy Commission define responsibilities and functions of its Division of Intelligence. (Pages 210-212 and 220 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

This matter is under discussion between AEC and CIA.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

As indicated above.

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TOP SECRETHOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That steps be taken to introduce highly selective methods of choosing members of the coordinating committee on atomic energy intelligence, not only to get the benefit of service by the most competent individuals, but also to assure long tenure in this important assignment. (Recommendation No. 8 of Public Report; pages 207-209, 213-215, 218, and 220 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

The CIA has always pressed for the assignment of the best qualified personnel to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. The record of the Committee in the matter of continuity and length of tenure appears very favorable, as shown by the following tabulation.

| | <u>REPRESENTATIVES</u> | <u>TENURE IN YEARS</u> |
|-----------|------------------------|------------------------|
| CIA | 3 | 1, 3, 4 (incumbent) |
| ARMY | 2 | 4, 1 " |
| NAVY | 1 | 8 " |
| AIR FORCE | 2 | 5, 2 " |
| STATE | 2 | 7, 1 " |
| FBI | 1 | 2 " |

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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HOOVER (CLARK) RECOMMENDATION

That the atomic energy portion of National Intelligence Estimates be reviewed to emphasize development of increased capabilities to obtain intelligence on Soviet wartime use and that the National Intelligence Estimates reflect full extent of available knowledge. (Pages 217-220 of the Top Secret Report.)

DOOLITTLE RECOMMENDATION

No corresponding recommendation.

CIA COMMENT

The CIA Board of Estimates is already doing this. Further, the Board is not only going into the Soviet wartime use of atomic energy, but is working on peace time application. It goes without saying that every effort is made to have the National Estimates reflect the full extent of available knowledge.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIA

Recommendation being implemented.

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